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19 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Justification for Trip to WH Area

25X1A 1. Historically, the Director of Security has considered it advisable for him or one of his senior officers, i. e., the DD/Sec., DD(IOS), DD(PPS) or their assistants, to make periodic visits to the overseas stations for the purpose of auditing and reviewing their overall security status, and to acquaint the office with conditions overseas. These audits are an integral function of the Security Office in its overall security responsibility. In the case of the WH area, the last visit by a senior Security Officer was made by [REDACTED] in 1959.

2. In support of the traditional position of the Director of Security as noted above, Recommendation No. 6 of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, resulting from the Dunlap case, states as follows:

"Recommendation No. 6

"That, as a means of achieving major counter-intelligence objectives, actions be taken within the sensitive agencies, as required, to assure the conduct of periodic, comprehensive, inspections concerning the adequacy of compliance with approved policies relating to personnel security investigations and clearances, security suspension of employees, physical security, document control, and the like."

Pronouncements by the Deputy Director for Support and the Inspector General have indicated the desirability of these overseas trips.

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3. The purpose of the currently proposed trip is to confer with Chiefs of Station and other senior officials on security matters, review security practices, and obtain general familiarization of security problems and requirements throughout the area. Items and activities to be covered during this visit will include:

- a. Discussions of any existing personnel security problems, including clearances and utilization of contract employees;
- b. To obtain Chiefs of Station appraisal of the [REDACTED] being furnished by Headquarters;
- c. Review of the physical security and internal security practices, including:
 - (1) Access controls,
 - (2) Existence of incinerators and other devices available for the destruction of classified material,
 - (3) Determine approximate amount of classified material stored at Station and estimate burn time,
 - (4) Review controls followed in the handling of TS and SI material;
- d. To determine extent of implementation of recommendations made in last physical security audit;
- e. Obtain an estimate of the political stability of the present government and its capability of protecting Agency installation and personnel from riots, etc.;
- f. Obtain from the Chief of Station and other officials an evaluation of the capability of the communist and other opposition forces to penetrate our activities;

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25X1A g. Discuss future security requirements of the Chiefs of Station, including [REDACTED], and other security support for planning purposes; 25X1A

25X1C h. [REDACTED]

4. It is mandatory for the survival of our overseas and general security responsibilities that the DD/P Divisions not be permitted to exercise a veto of our audit trips overseas. I should point out that several attempts have previously been made by DD/P Divisions to veto OS trips but each has been overruled upon appeal to higher authority.

[REDACTED] 25X1A
Deputy Director of Security (PPS)

25X1A [REDACTED] *DD/S*

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3					
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